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Abstract
We discuss the unambiguous measurement of quantum nonorthogonal states in connection with
the quantum cryptography. We show that checking a ratio of null one to signal is essential in
detecting a certain kind of eavesdropping in the case of two nonorthogonal states quantum cryp-
tography. We prove that it is not needed in the case of the four states quantum cryptography.
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One of the most intriguing and exciting recent developments in quantum mechanics has
been the prediction and demonstration of a cryptographic key distribution scheme, the secu-
rity of which is guaranteed by the laws of physics, or, rather, the laws of quantum mechanics
[1]. Theoretical models for quantum key distributions has been proposed based on the uncer-
tainty principle [2], EPR states [3], two nonorthogonal states [4] and Wheeler’s delayed choice
experiment [5].
The security of quantum cryptography relies on the fact that we cannot distinguish, with
certainty, several quantum nonorthogonal states ( with 100% efficiency ). That is, if we can dis-
tinguish the several quantum nonorthogonal states used as the information carriers in quantum
cryptography, then we can successfully eavesdrop it. However, there is one exception in the
indistinguishability: in the case of two nonorthogonal states, we can distinguish between them
with certainty, albeit with an efficiency η < 1 [7]-[9] ( the unambiguous quantum measurement
). What we will consider in connection with the quantum cryptography is a simple example
of the unambiguous quantum measurement: suppose that we are given spin-1
2
particles in one
of two nonorthogonal states, for example, |z+〉 or |x+〉, where |z±〉 ( |x±〉 ) is an eigenstate
with the eigenvalue ± h¯
2
of the spin-measurement along z ( x ) direction Sˆz ( Sˆx ). We per-
form Sˆz or Sˆx at random on each particle. When we get the outcome |z−〉 ( |x−〉 ), we can
know, with certainty, that the measured particle was not in the |z+〉 ( |x+〉 ) state, that is,
the measured particle was in the |x+〉 ( |z+〉 ) state ( the conclusive result ). When we get the
outcome |z+〉 or |x+〉, on the other hand, we do not know whether the measured particle was
in |z+〉 or |x+〉 state ( the inconclusive result ). In Ref.[7]-[9], they consider more optimal ones
where the efficiency ( the probability of obtaining the conclusive result ) is higher than that (
η = 1
2
|〈z + |x+〉|2 = 1
4
) of this example. What we discuss in this note applies also to the more
optimal ones.
Although the same thing can be said for the quantum cryptography using four nonorthogonal
states [2] ( hereafter the four states one ), we briefly describe only that using two nonorthogonal
states [4, 6] ( hereafter the two states one ): (1) Alice send to Bob a random binary sequence
encoded on quantum carriers using two nonorthogonal states |0〉 and |1〉 to denote bits 0 and 1,
respectively. Since any two nonorthogonal states work, we may adopt here |z+〉 and |x+〉 as |0〉
2
and |1〉, respectively, for convenience of the following discussions, (2) Bob measures randomly
and independently of Alice between Sˆz and Sˆx. (3) Bob publically tells Alice in which instances
his measurement had the outcome −, without telling the direction. (4) Alice and Bob discard all
instances which failed to produce either |z−〉 or |x−〉, so that the remaining instances should
be perfectly correlated, consisting entirely of instances in which Alice sent |z+〉 and Bob’s
outcome is |x−〉 or Alice sent |x+〉 and Bob’s outcome is |z−〉. (5) Alice and Bob check for
eavesdropping by revealing to each other in public some randomly chosen subsequence of bits
which they subsequently discard. If there had been eavesdropping, the eavesdropper is bound
to introduce some errors in the perfect correlation in (4). If the test is negative, the distribution
must be set up again, if the test is positive the remaining unrevealed bits form the key.
Now we can expect that the existence of the unambiguous measurement in the case of
two states one, may be used in the following eavesdropping strategy: the eavesdropper Eve
intercepts signal which Alice sends to Bob and Eve measures random sequence of Sˆz and Sˆx
on it. If Eve detects |z−〉 ( |x−〉 ) then Eve knows that Alice must have sent |x+〉 ( |z+〉 ) (
the conclusive result ). If Eve detects |z+〉 or |x+〉 then Eve does not know which state Alice
have sent ( the inconclusive result ). Now Eve sends Bob the same signal as that Alice has
sent only in the case of the conclusive result. Eve sends no signal to Bob in the case of the
inconclusive result. This strategy cause no asymmetry in numbers of |z+〉 and |x+〉 states,
since z and x are treated symmetrically by Eve in this strategy. Thus this strategy escape the
first simple test of the ratio of |z+〉 and |x+〉 by Bob. Furthermore, Bob cannot detect this
strategy by the checking procedure described in (5), because this strategy give rise to no error.
Instead, this strategy unavoidably increases the number of absorbed signals due to the fact
that the efficiency is less than 1. Thus Bob should detect this strategy by checking the rate of
absorbed signals: Bob check the ratio of null one to signal. If this ratio is higher significantly
than that expected from Alice’s signal-sending- rate, absorption rate of communication channel
and efficiency of detectors then Bob have to discard the data. Ekert et al. also commented
[12] that rate R of inconclusive result ( R is proportional to rate of null signal if we regard the
detection of |z+〉 and |x+〉 as null ones ) can be used to detect eavesdropping. However, in
their work checking R played only supplementary role in detecting eavesdropping. What we
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have shown is that checking R is essential in detecting a certain eavesdropping described above,
since such an eavesdropping does not contribute to the error rate being checked in (5).
One may argue that we need not be concerned about such an eavesdropping because Eve
does not know which states Alice and Bob chose as |0〉 and |1〉. However, this is not the case
because Eve is able to know about the two states by a method of trial and error: Eve tries
eavesdropping with some conjectured two measurement directions until the eavesdropping is
successful. In fact, if there had not been this method, we could have built a simple quantum
cryptography where we encode 0 and 1 on |u+〉 and |u−〉, respectively, where u is an arbitrary
direction which only Alice and Bob know.
Since a similar eavesdropping strategy - to send the same quantum states in the case of the
conclusive result and to send no state in the case of inconclusive result - applies to the four
states one, it is important to prove that the unambiguous quantum measurement is not possible
in this case: if not, we should check the rate of absorbed signals in the four state one, too. We
prove it in the following. First, we consider an experimental setup of the Einstein- Podolsky-
Rosen ( EPR ) [14, 15], where we intend the superluminal communication: let the state of source
particle pairs is the singlet one 1√
2
(|u+〉1|u+〉2−|u−〉1|u−〉2) (=
1√
2
(|u′+〉1|u
′+〉2−|u
′−〉1|u
′−〉2)
) , where u and u′ denote two arbitrary different directions and the subscript 1 and 2 denote
the two sites which may be space-likely separated each other. If the one at site 1 performs
spin-measurement along u (u′) direction Sˆu ( Sˆu′ ), the state of particles given at site 2 is
the mixture of |u+〉 and |u−〉 ( |u′+〉 and |u′−〉 ) with equal probability. Thus if the one at
site 2 can distinguish between them, the one at site 1 can send signal instantaneously to the
one at site 2, by performing Sˆu or Sˆu′ , according to the 2-bit sequence he wants to send. Of
course, this is not possible because the density operators corresponding to the two mixtures
is an identical one 1
2
|u+〉〈u + | + 1
2
|u−〉〈u − | ( = 1
2
|u′+〉〈u′ + | + 1
2
|u′−〉〈u′ − | ). Now we
prove the impossibility of the unambiguous measurement in this case. Suppose that there is
an unambiguous measurement with which we can know one of the four states, say |u+〉, with
certainty, and with an efficiency η ( η < 1 ). The one at site 1 performs Sˆu ( Sˆu′ ) N times
( N > 1
η
and N is an integer ) when the signal bit is 0 ( 1 ). The one at site 2 performs
the unambiguous measurement N times which distinguish |u+〉. Then, when the one at site 1
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performs Sˆu ( Sˆu′ ), the state given at site 2 is mixture of |u+〉 and |u−〉 ( |u
′+〉 and |u′−〉 )
with equal probability, and thus, the unambiguous measurement give the outcome that |u+〉
is detected with certainty with the probability p = Nη > 1 ( that |u+〉 is not detected with
certainty, at all ). Thus the one at site 2 can distinguish the two mixtures and can implement
the superluminal communication. It follows that the unambiguous measurement is not possible
in this case from the impossibility of the superluminal communication.
Above we have shown that in the four states one the eavesdropping strategy considered
above does not come into being, since there is no unambiguous measurement in the four states
one. And many recent proposals and elaborations of quantum cryptographic implementations
are based on the four states one. Thus, it may be said that we need not be concerned about
such an eavesdropping. However, considering some possible applications of the two states one
such as the recently proposed one by B. Huttner et al.[13] where the two states one and the four
states one are combined to obtain a safer one than the two previous ones, the above strategy
should be considered.
In summary, we discussed the unambiguous measurement of quantum nonorthogonal states
in connection with the quantum cryptography. We showed that checking a ratio of null one to
signal is essential in detecting a certain kind of eavesdropping in the case of two nonorthogonal
states quantum cryptography. We proved that it is not needed in the case of the four states
quantum cryptography.
References
[1] S.Wiesner, Sigact News15(1)(1983), 78
[2] C.H.Bennett and G.Brassard, in: Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Computers, systems, and signal
processing, Bangalore (IEEE, New York, 1984) p.175
[3] A.K.Ekert, Phys.Rev.Lett.67 (1991), 661; C.H.Bennett, G.Brassard, and N.D.Mermin,
Phys.Rev.Lett.68 (1992), 557
[4] C.H.Bennett, Phys.Rev.Lett.68(1992), 3121
5
[5] M.Ardehali, Phys.Lett.A217 (1996), 301
[6] A.K.Ekert, Nature 358(1992), 14
[7] I.D.Ivanovic, Phys.Lett.A123(1987), 257
[8] A.Peres, Phys.Lett.A128(1988), 19
[9] B.Huttner, A.Muller, J.D.Gautier, H.Zbinden, and N.Gisin, Phys.Rev.A54(1996), 3783
[10] A.Peres, Quantum Theory: Concepts and Methods (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1993), Chap.9
[11] J.M.Jauch and C.Piron, Helv.Phys.Acta40 (1967), 559
[12] A.K.Ekert, B.Huttner, G.M.Palma, A.Peres, Phys.Rev.A 50(1994), 1047
[13] B.Huttner, N.Imoto, N.Gisin, and T.Mor, Phys.Rev.A 51(1995), 1863
[14] A.Einstein, B.Podolsky, and N.Rosen, Phys. Rev. 47(1935), 777
[15] F.Selleri, ed., Quantum Mechanics and Local Realism, The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen para-
dox ( Plenum, New York, 1988 )
6
